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I. INTRODUCTION
Conflict is inevitable, but efficient and fair resolution is not.
Conflicts can persist even though there may be any number of possible
resolutions that would better serve the interests of the parties - the recent
history of ethnic and 'religious strife in Lebanon, Israel, Cyprus, and
Yugoslavia serves as a reminder of this. In our everyday personal and
professional lives, we have all witnessed disputes where the absence of a
resolution imposes substantial and avoidable costs on all parties.
Moreover, many resolutions that are achieved - whether through
negotiation or imposition - conspicuously fail to satisfy the economist's
criterion of Pareto efficiency. Let me offer a few examples where, at
least with the benefit of hindsight, it is easy to identify alternative
resolutions that might have left both parties better off.
My first example involves a divorcing family in California who
were part of a longitudinal study carried out by Stanford psychologist
Eleanor Maccoby and me.1 Mary and Paul Templeton spent three years
fighting over the custody of their seven year- old daughter Tracy after
Mary filed for divorce in 1985. Mary wanted sole custody; Paul wanted
joint physical custody. This middle-income family spent over $37,000 on
lawyers and experts. In the process, they traumatized Tracy and inflicted
great emotional pain on each other. More to the point, the conflict over
who would best care for their daughter damaged each parent's relationship
with Tracy, who has suffered terribly by being caught in the middle of her
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1. The results of our full study, which involved some 1100 families, are described in
ELEANOR MACCOBY & ROBERT MNOOKIN, DIVIDING THE CHILD: SOCIAL AND LEGAL
DILEMMAS OF CUSTODY (1992).
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parents' conflict. Ultimately the divorce decree provided that Mary would
have primary physical custody of Tracy, and Paul would be entitled to
reasonable weekend visitation. The parents' inability to negotiate with one
another led to a result in which mother, father, and daughter were all
losers.
A conflict between Eastern Airlines and its unions represents
another conspicuous example of a lose-lose outcome. In 1986, Frank
Lorenzo took over Eastern, then the eighth largest American airline, with
over 42,000 employees and about 1,000 daily flights to seventy cities. For
the next three years, Lorenzo, considered a union buster by organized
labor, pressed the airline's unions for various concessions, and laid off
workers to reduce costs. The unions retaliated in a variety of ways,
including a public relations campaign suggesting Eastern's airplanes were
being improperly maintained because Lorenzo was inappropriately cutting
costs. In March 1989, labor-management skirmishes turned into all-out
war. Eastern's machinists went on strike, and the pilots and flight
attendants initially joined in. The ensuing "no holds barred" battle
between Lorenzo and the machinists led to losses on both sides.
Soon after the strike began, to put pressure on the unions and to
avoid creditor claims, Eastern's management filed for bankruptcy, hired
permanent replacements for the strikers, and began to sell off assets.
While the pilots and flight attendants held out only a few months, the
machinists union persisted in its strike, determined to get rid of Lorenzo at
whatever cost. In one sense, they succeeded, for in 1990 the bankruptcy
court forced Lorenzo to relinquish control of Eastern. It turned out to be
a pyrrhic victory for the union, however, for on January 18, 1991, Eastern
Airlines permanently shut down operations.2
The titanic struggle between Texaco and Pennzoil over Getty Oil
provides another example of a bargaining failure, although of a somewhat
more subtle sort. Here, both corporations survived, with a clear winner
and loser; Texaco paid Pennzoil $3 billion in cash to end the dispute in
1988. The parties reached settlement, however, only after a year-long
bankruptcy proceeding for Texaco and protracted legal wrangling in
various courts. While the dispute dragged on, the combined equity value
of the two companies was reduced by some $3.4 billion? A settlement
before Texaco filed for bankruptcy would have used up fewer social
2. For the story of the battle between labor and management at Eastern Airlines, see
AARON BERNSTEIN, GROUNDED: FRANK LORENZO AND THE DESTRUcTION OF EASTERN
AIRLINES (1990).
3. See David M. Cutler and Lawrence H. Summers, The Cost of Conflict Resolution and
Financial Distress: Evidence from the Tesaco-Pennzoil Litigation, 19 RAND J. ECON. 157,
158 (1988).
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resources and would have been more valuable to the shareholders of both
companies than the resolution created by the bankruptcy court about a year
later.
4
My last example is an Art Buchwald story - but it isn't a
laughing matter, at least, not for Buchwald. He and his partner, Alain
Bernheim, submitted Buchwald's two and a half page "treatment" for a
story called "King for a Day" to Paramount Pictures pursuant to contracts
providing that Bermheim would produce any film based on the story idea
and that Buchwald and Bernheim would each share in the profits. In
1989, Buchwald and Bernheim sued Paramount for breach of contractS
They claimed that the studio had based Eddie Murphy's film, "Coming to
America," on their treatment but had failed to give them their due. After
three years of bitter litigation, a trial judge awarded Buchwald $150,000
and Bernheim $750,000. In the initial newspaper accounts, both sides
claimed victory, but this is hardly an example of "win-win." Paramount
claimed to be the winner because the legal fees of the plaintiffs' lawyers
exceeded $2.5 million and the total recovery of only $900,000 was a small
fraction of the $6.2 million Buchwald and Beraheim had requested-in their
final arguments. As it turns out, Buchwald and Bemheim will not have to
pay the full legal fees because of a contingency arrangement with their law
firm,' but Buchwald has acknowledged that his share of out-of-pocket
expenses alone exceeds $200,000, and that as a consequence, he will
have no net recovery." On the other hand, Buchwald ridiculed
4. For an extended analysis of this case, arguing that rational choices by each party led
to less than optimum outcomes for both, see Robert H. Mnookin & Robert R. Wilson,
Rational Bargaining and Market Efficiency: Understanding Pennzoil v. Texaco, 75 VA. L.
REV. 295 (1989).
5. Robert W. Welkos and Terry Pristin, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 17, 1992, at B-1; L.A.
DAILY J., Mar. 17, 1992, at 3. The case is described, from the perspective of Buchwald's
lawyer, in PIERCE O'DONNELL & DENNIS McDouGAL, FATAL SUBTRACTION: How
HOLLYWOOD REALLY DOES BUSINESS (1992).
6. Thus, Buchwald's lawyers - the firm of Kaye, Scholer, Fierman, Hays & Handler,
which has had more than its share of troubles in 1992 - may have been the big loser. See
Barbara Franklin, Buchwald v. Paramount: Suit Attacks Hollywood's Idea of Sharing Profits,
N.Y. L.J., Jan. 3, 1991, at 5.
7. L.A. DAILY J., Mar. 17, 1992, at 3. In his introduction to a book about the case,
Buchwald indicates that the "expenses came to $400,000 for Bernheim and myself." See
also, O'DONNELL& MCDOUGAL, supra note 5, at xvii.
8. Buchwald has written:
When I got involved, I expected to be in a business dispute that I
assumed would be resolved early in the game for a minimal sum of
money and, hopefully, an apology.. . . One of the discoveries of a suit
such as this is that it makes you hurt deeply, and you don't forgive
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Paramount's claim of victory. How, he asked, could it be a victory for a
defendant to pay out nearly $1 million in damages, and, in addition, have
legal fees of its own in excess of $3 million.9 Seems like lose-lose to me.
On her death bed, Gertrude Stein was asked by Alice B. Toklas,
"What is the answer? What is the answer?" After a long silence, Stein
responded: "No, what is the question?""0 Examples like these, and I am
sure you could add many more of your own, suggest a central question for
those of us concerned with dispute resolution: Why is it that under
circumstances where there are resolutions that better serve disputants,
negotiations often fail to achieve efficient resolutions? In other words,
what are the barriers to the negotiated resolution of conflict?
II. BARRIERS TO THE NEGOTIATED RESOLUTION OF CONFLICT
In this evening's lecture, I will explore four such barriers."
Each of these barriers reflect somewhat different theoretical perspectives
on negotiation and dispute resolution. The first barrier is a strategic
barrier, which is suggested by game theory and the economic analysis of
bargaining.' The barrier relates to an underlying dilemma inherent in
the negotiation process. Every negotiation characteristically involves a
tension between: (a) discovering shared interests and maximizing joint
gains, and (b) maximizing one's own gains where more for one side will
necessarily mean less for the other. The second barrier arises as a result
of the principal/agent problem. In many disputes, principals do not
negotiate on their own behalf but instead act through agents who may have
somewhat different incentives than their principals. This work draws on
research concerning the "principal/agent" problem in law and economics
easily. [Another thing I discovered] [d]o not count on any money in a
lawsuit - this is as true if you win as if you lose.
O'DONNELL & McDOUGAL, supra note 5, at xvii-xviii.
9. Franklin, supra note 6, at 7.
10. F.W. Dupee, General Introduction in SELECTED WRITINGS OF GERTRUDE STEIN
xvll 1990.
11. The Stanford Center on Conflict and Negotiation has been exploring various barriers
to the negotiated resolution of conflict. A collection of essays on this topic, including the
introductory chapter that I have co-authored with Lee Ross, is now in press, BARRIERS TO
THE NEGOTIATED RESOLUTION OF CONFLICT (K. Arrow et al., eds., in press).
12. See, e.g., AvINASH DIXIT & BARRY NALEBUFF, THINKING STRATEGICALLY: THE
COMPETITIVE EDGE IN BUSINESS, POLITICS, AND EVERYDAY LIFE 1-7 (1991).
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and transaction cost economics.' The third barrier is cognitive, and
relates to how the human mind processes information, especially in
evaluating risks and uncertainty. My discussion here draws on recent
work in cognitive psychology, especially the pathbreaking research of my
colleague, Amos Tversky and his collaborator, Daniel Kalmeman.'4 The
fourth and final barrier, "reactive devaluation," draws on the social
psychological research of my colleague Lee Ross, and relates to the fact
that bargaining is an interactive social process in which each party is
constantly drawing inferences about the intentions, motives, and good faith
of the other."5
As should be obvious, I am not attempting to provide a
comprehensive list of barriers or an all-encompassing classification
scheme. Instead, my purpose is to show that the concept of barriers
provides a useful and necessarily interdisciplinary vantage point for
exploring why negotiations sometimes fail. After describing these four
barriers and their relevance to the study of negotiation, I will briefly
suggest a variety of ways that neutral third parties might help overcome
each of these barriers.
A. Strategic Barriers
The first barrier to the negotiated resolution of conflict is inherent
in a central characteristic of negotiation. Negotiation can be
metaphorically compared to making a pie and then dividing it up. The
process of conflict resolution affects both the size of the pie, and who gets
what size slice.
The disputants' behavior may affect the size of the pie in a variety
of ways. On the one hand, spending on avoidable legal fees and other
process costs shrinks the pie. On the other hand, negotiators can together
"create value" and make the pie bigger by discovering resolutions in which
each party contributes special complementary skills that can be combined
in a synergistic way, or by exploiting differences in- relative preferences
that permit trades that make both parties better off.1" Books like "Getting
to Yes" and proponents of "win-win negotiation" emphasize the potential
13. See OLIvER E. WILLIAMSON, THE ECONOMIC INSTITUTION OF CAPITALISM (1985);
PAUL MILGROM & JOHN ROBERTS, ECONOMICS, ORGANIZATIONS AND MANAGEMENT
(1992).
14. See JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND BIASES, (Daniel Kahneman
et al., eds., 1982).
15. Constance A. Stillinger et al., The 'Reactive Devaluation' Barrier to Conflict
Resolution, J. OF PERSONALITY AND SOC. PSYCHOL. (under review).
16. JOHN MCMILLAN, GAMES, STRATEGIES, AND MANAGERS 45 (1992).
OHIO STATE JOURNAL ON DISPUTE RESOLUTION [Vol. 8:2 1993]
benefits of collaborative problem-solving approaches to negotiation which
allow parties to maximize the size of the pie.1"
Negotiation also involves issues concerning the distribution of
benefits, and, with respect to pure distribution, both parties cannot be
made better off at the same time. Given a pie of fixed size, a larger slice
for you means a smaller one for me.
Because bargaining typically entails-both efficiency issues (that is,
how big the pie can be made) and distributive issues (that is, who gets
what size slice), negotiation involves an inherent tension - one that David
Lax and James Sebenius have dubbed the "negotiator's dilemma. "" In
order to create value, it is critically important that options be created in
light of both parties' underlying interests and preferences. This suggests
the importance of openness and disclosure, so that a variety of options can
be analyzed and compared from the perspectives of all concerned.
However, when it comes to the distributive aspects of bargaining, full
disclosure -- particularly if unreciprocated by the other side - can often
lead to outcomes in which the more open party receives a comparatively
smaller slice. To put it another way, unreciprocated approaches to
creating value leave their maker vulnerable to claiming tactics. On the
other hand, focusing on the distributive aspects of bargaining can often
lead to unnecessary deadlocks and, more fundamentally, a failure to
discover options or alternatives that make both sides better off. A
simple example can expose the dilemma. The first involves what game
theorists call "information asymmetry."19 This simply means each side to
a negotiation characteristically knows some relevant facts that the other
side does not know.
Suppose I have ten apples and no oranges, and Nancy Rogers has
ten oranges and no apples. (Assume apples and oranges are otherwise
unavailable to either of us.) I love oranges and hate apples. Nancy likes
them both equally well. I suggest to Nancy that we might both be made
better off through a trade. If I disclose to Nancy that I love oranges and
don't eat apples, and Nancy wishes to engage in strategic bargaining, she
might simply suggest that her preferences are the same as mine, although,
in truth, she likes both. She might propose that I give her nine apples
(which she says have little value to her) in exchange for one of her very
valuable oranges. Because it is often very difficult for one party to know
the underlying preferences of the other party, parties in a negotiation may
17. ROGER FISHER, WILLIAM URY, & BRUCE PATTON, GETTING TO YES (2nd ed.
1991).
18. DAVID A. LAX & JAMES K. SEBENIUS, THE MANAGER AS NEGOTIATOR (1986).
19. ERIC RASMUSSEN, GAMES AND INFORMATION: AN INTRODUCTION TO GAME
THEORY 107 (1989).
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puff, bluff, or lie about their underlying interests and preferences.'
Indeed, in many negotiations, it may never be possible to know whether
the other side has honestly disclosed its interests and preferences. I have
to be open to create value, but my openness may work to my disadvantage
with respect to the distributive aspect of the negotiation.
Even when both parties know all the relevant information, and
that potential gains may result from a negotiated deal, strategic bargaining
over how to divide the pie can still lead to deadlock (with no deal at all)
or protracted and expensive bargaining, thus shrinking the pie. For
example, suppose Nancy has a house for sale for which she has a
reservation price of $245,000. I am willing to pay up to $295,000 for the
house. Any deal within a bargaining range from $245,000 to $295,000
would make both of us better off than no sale at all. Suppose we each
know the other's reservation price. Will there be a deal? Not necessarily.
If we disagree about how the $50,000 "surplus" should be divided (each
wanting all or most of it), our negotiation may end in a deadlock. We
might engage in hardball negotiation tactics in which each tried to
persuade the other that he or she was committed to walking away from a
beneficial deal, rather than accept less than $40,000 of the surplus. Nancy
might claim that she won't take a nickel less than $285,000, or even
$294,999 for that matter. Indeed, she might go so far as to give a power
of attorney to an agent to sell only at that price, and then leave town in
order to make her commitment credible. Of course, I could.play the same
type of game and the result would then be that no deal is made and that
we are both worse off. In this case, the obvious tension between the
distribution of the $50,000 and the value creating possibilities inherent in
any sale within the bargaining range may result in no deal.
Strategic behavior - which may be rational for a self-interested
party concerned with maximizing the size of his or her own slice - can
often lead to inefficient outcomes. Those subjected to claiming tactics
often respond in kind, and the net result typically is to push up the cost of
the dispute resolution process. (Buchwald v. Paramount Pictures
Corp.,2' is a good example of a case in which the economic costs of
hardball litigation obviously and substantially shrunk the pie.) Parties may
be tempted to engage in strategic behavior, hoping to get more. Often all
they do is shrink the size of the pie. Those experienced in the civil
litigation process see this all the time. One or both sides often attempt to
use pre-trial discovery as leverage to force the other side into agreeing to a
more favorable settlement. Often the net result, however, is simply that
20. Id. at 205.
21. No. C 706083, 1990 WL 357611 (Cal.Superior Jan. 8, 1990).
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both sides spend unnecessary money on the dispute resolution process.
B. The Principal/Agent Problem
The second barrier is suggested by recent work relating to
transaction cost economics, and is sometimes called the "principal/agent"
problem.' Notwithstanding the jargon, the basic idea is familiar to
everyone in this room. The basic problem is that the incentives for an
agent (whether it be a lawyer, employee, or officer) negotiating on behalf
of a party to a dispute may induce behavior that fails to serve the interests
of the principal itself. The relevant research suggests that it is no simple
matter -- whether by contract or custom -- to align perfectly the incentives
for an agent with the interests of the principal.? This divergence may
act as a barrier to efficient resolution of conflict.
Litigation is fraught with principal/agent problems. In civil
litigation, for example -- particularly where the lawyers on both sides are
being paid by the hour - there is very little incentive for the opposing
lawyers to cooperate, particularly if the clients have the capacity to pay for
trench warfare and are angry to boot. Commentators have suggested that
this is one reason many cases settle on the courthouse steps, and not
before: for the lawyers, a late settlement may avoid the possible
embarrassment of an extreme outcome, while at the same time providing
substantial fees.'
The Texaco/Pennzoil dispute may have involved a principal/agent
problem of a different sort. My colleague Bob Wilson and I have argued
that the interests of the Texaco officers and directors diverged from those
of the Texaco shareholders in ways that may well have affected the
conduct of that litigation. 2  Although the shareholders would have
benefitted from an earlier settlement, the litigation was controlled by the
directors, officers, and lawyers whose interests differed in important
respects. A close examination of the incentives for the management of
Texaco in particular suggests an explanation for the delay in settlement.
The directors and officers of Texaco were themselves defendants
in fourteen lawsuits, eleven of them derivative shareholder actions,
brought after the original multi-billion dollar Pennzoil verdict in the Texas
trial court. These lawsuits essentially claimed that Texaco's directors and
22. RASMUSSEN, supra note 19, at 136.
23. DREw FUDENBERO & JEAN TIROLE, GAME THEORY 297 (1991).
24. P'ng, Strategic Behavior in Suit, Settlement, and Trial, 14 BELL J. ECON. 539
(Autumn 1983).
25. Mnookin & Wilson, supra note 4, at 295, 315-323.
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officers had violated their duty of care to the corporation by causing
Texaco to acquire Getty Oil in a manner that led to the multi-billion dollar
Texas judgment.' After this verdict, and for the next several years, the
Texaco management rationally might have preferred to appeal the Pennzoil
judgment and seek complete vindication, even though a speedy settlement
for the expected value of the litigation might have better served their
shareholders. Because they faced the risk of personal liability, the
directors and officers of Texaco acted in such a way as to suggest they
would prefer to risk pursuing the case to the bitter end (with some slight
chance of complete exoneration) rather than accept a negotiated resolution,
even though in so doing they risked subjecting the corporation to a ten
billion dollar judgment. The case ultimately did settle, but only through a
bankruptcy proceeding in which the bankruptcy court eliminated the risk of
personal liability for Texaco's officers and directors."
C. Cognitive Barriers.
The third barrier is a by-product of the way the human mind
processes information, deals with risks and uncertainties, and makes
inferences and judgments. Research by cognitive psychologists during the
last fifteen years suggests several ways in which human reasoning often
departs from that suggested by theories of rational judgment and decision
making.' Daniel Kalneman and Amos Tversky have done research on a
number of cognitive biases that are relevant to negotiation.' This
evening, I would like to focus on two aspects of their work: those relating
to loss aversion and framing effects.
Suppose everyone attending this evening's lecture is offered the
following happy choice: At the end of my lecture you can exit at the
north end of the hall or the south end. If you choose the north exit, you
will be handed an envelope in which there will be a crisp new twenty
dollar bill. Instead, if you choose the south exit, you will be given a
sealed envelope randomly pulled from a bin. One quarter of these
envelopes contain a $100 bill, but three quarters are empty. In other
26. In 1985, a Texas jury awarded $7.53 billion in compensatory damages and $3 billion
in punitive damages to Pennzoil. See Texaco, Inc. v. Pennzoil Co., 626 F. Supp. 250
(S.D.N.Y. 1986).
27. Mnookin & Wilson, supra note 4.
28. Amos Tversky et al., Contingent Weighting in Judgment and Choice, 95 PSYCHOL.
REV. 371-384 (July 1988).
29. For a discussion of various cognitive barriers, see Daniel Kahneman and Amos
Tversky, Conflict Resolution: A Cognitive Perspective, in BARRIERS TO CONFLICT
RESOLUTION (K. Arrow et al. eds., in press).
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words, you can have a sure gain of $20 if you go out the north door, or
you can instead gamble by choosing the south door where you will have a
25% chance of winning $100 and a 75% chance of winning nothing.
Which would you choose? A great deal of experimental work suggests
that the overwhelming majority of you would choose the sure gain of $20,
even though the "expected value" of the second alternative, $25, is slightly
more. This is a well known phenomenon called "risk aversion." The
principle is that most people will take a sure thing over a gamble, even
where the gamble may have a somewhat higher "expected" payoff.
Daniel Kabneman and Amos Tversky have advanced our
understanding of behavior under uncertainty with a remarkable discovery.
They suggest that, in order to avoid what would otherwise be a sure loss,
many people will gamble, even if the expected loss from the gamble is
larger. Their basic idea can be illustrated by changing my hypothetical.
Although you didn't know this when you were invited to this lecture, it is
not free. At the end of the lecture, the doors are going to be locked. If
you go out the north door, you'll be required to pay $20 as an exit fee. If
you go out the south door, you'll participate in a lottery by drawing an
envelope. Three quarters of the time you're going to be let out for free,
but one quarter of the time you're going to be required to pay $100. Rest
assured all the money is going to the Dean's fund - a very good cause.
What do you choose? There's a great deal of empirical research, based
on the initial work of Kahneman and Tversky, suggesting that the majority
of this audience would choose the south exit -- i.e., most of you would
gamble to avoid having to lose $20 for sure. 30 Kahneman and Tversky
call this "loss aversion."
Now think of these two examples together. Risk aversion
suggests that most of you would not gamble for a gain, even though the
expected value of $25 exceeds the sure thing of $20. On the other hand,
most of you would gamble to avoid a sure loss, even though, on the
average, the loss of going out the south door is higher. Experimental
evidence suggests that the proportion of people who will gamble to avoid a
loss is much greater than those who would gamble to realize a gain.
Loss aversion can act as a cognitive barrier to the negotiated
resolution of conflict for a variety of reasons. For example, both sides
may fight on in a dispute in the hope that they may avoid any losses, even
though the continuation of the dispute involves a gamble in which the loss
may end up being far greater. Loss aversion may explain Lyndon
Johnson's decision, in 1965, to commit additional troops to Vietnam as an
30. Amos Tversky & Richard Thaler, Anomalies: Preference Reversals, 4 J. ECON.
PERSPECTIVES 201 (Spring 1990); Amos Tversky et al., The Causes of Preference Reversals
80 AM. ECON. REv. 204 (March 1990).
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attempt to avoid the sure loss attendant to withdrawal, and as a gamble
that there might be some way in the future to avoid any loss at all.
Similarly, negotiators may, in some circumstances, be adverse to offering
a concession in circumstances where they view the concession as a sure
loss. Indeed, the notion of rights or entitlements may be associated with a
more extreme form of loss aversion that Kahneman and Tversky call
"enhanced loss aversion," because losses "compounded by outrage are
much less acceptable than losses that are caused by misfortune or by
legitimate actions of others."3'
One of the most striking features of loss aversion is that whether
something is viewed as a gain or loss - and what kind of gain or loss it is
considered - depends upon a -reference point, and the choice of a
reference point is sometimes manipulable. Once again, a simple example
suggested by Kalmeman and Tversky, can illustrate.
Suppose you and a friend decide to go to Cleveland for a big
night out on the town. You've made reservations at an elegant restaurant
that will cost $100 a couple. In addition, you've bought two superb seats
-- at $50 each - to hear the Cleveland orchestra. You set off for
Cleveland, thinking you have your symphony tickets and $100, but no
credit cards.
Imagine that you park your car in Cleveland and make a
horrifying discovery - you've lost the tickets. Assume that you cannot be
admitted to the symphony without tickets. Also imagine that someone is
standing in front of the Symphony Hall offering to sell two tickets for
$100. You have a choice. You can use the $100 you intended for the
fancy dinner to buy the tickets to hear the concert, or you can skip the
concert and simply go to dinner. What would you do?
Consider a second hypothetical. After you park your car, you
look in your wallet and you realize to your horror that the $100 is gone,
but the tickets are there. In front of the Symphony Hall is a person
holding a small sign indicating she would like to buy two tickets for $100.
What do you do? Do you sell the tickets and go to dinner? Or do you
instead skip dinner and simply go to the concert?
Experimental research suggests that in the first example many
more people will skip the symphony and simply go out to dinner, while in
the second example, the proportions are nearly reversed; most people
would skip dinner and go to the concert.' The way we keep our mental
accounts is such that, in the first instance, to buy the tickets a second time
would somehow be to overspend our ticket budget. And, yet, an
31. Kahneman et al., supra note 14.
32. Id.
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economist would point out that the two situations are essentially identical
because there is a ready and efficient market in which you can convert
tickets to money or money to tickets.
The purpose of the hypotheticals is to suggest that whether or not
an event is framed as a loss can often affect behavior. This powerful idea
concerning "framing" has important implications for the resolution of
disputes to which I will return later.
D. "Reactive Devaluation" of Compromises and Concessions.
The final barrier I wish to discuss is "reactive devaluation," and
is an example of a social/psychological barrier that arises from the
dynamics of the negotiation process and the inferences that negotiators
draw from their interactions. My Stanford colleague, psychology
Professor Lee Ross, and his students have done experimental work to
suggest that, especially between adversaries, when one side offers a
particular concession or proposes a particular exchange of compromises,
the other side may diminish the attractiveness of that offer or proposed
exchange simply because it originated with a perceived opponent. The
basic notion is a familiar one, especially for lawyers. How often have you
had a client indicate to you in the midst of litigation, "If only we could
settle this case for $7,000. I'd love to put this whole matter behind me."
Lo and behold, the next day, the other side's attorney calls and offers to
settle for $7,000. You excitedly call your client and say, "Guess what --
the other side has just offered to settle this case for $7,000." You expect
to hear jubilation on the other end of the phone, but instead there is
silence. Finally, your client says, "Obviously they must know something
we don't know. If $7,000 is a good settlement for them, it can't be a
good settlement for us."
Both in laboratory and field settings, Ross and his colleagues have
marshalled interesting evidence for "reactive devaluation." They have
demonstrated both that a given compromise proposal is rated less
positively when proposed by someone on the other side than when
proposed by a neutral or an ally. They also demonstrated that a
concession that is actually offered is rated lower than a concession that is
withheld, and that a compromise is rated less highly after it has been put
on the table by the other side than it was beforehand.'
An example which should provide the flavor of this research is
33. See Stillinger et al., supra note 15. See also, Lee Ross & Constance Stillinger,
Barriers to Conflict Resolution, 7 NEGOTIATION J. 389 (Oct. 1991).
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the work of Ross and his colleagues.' One study took place in the
context of a campus-wide controversy at Stanford over university
investment policy concerning companies that did business with South
Africa. Ross and his colleagues asked Stanford students to consider two
compromise proposals. One proposal, termed the "specific divestment
plan," entailed immediate Stanford divestment from corporations doing
business with the South African military or police. The other, so-called
"deadline plan," proposed to create a committee of students and trustees to
monitor investment responsibility, with the promise of total divestment two
years down the road if the committee was not satisfied with the rate of
progress shown in dismantling the apartheid system in South Africa.
The experiment went as follows: one group of randomly assigned
students was told that the University planned to undertake specific
divestment, another group was told that the University planned to
undertake the deadline plan, the remainder were given no specific reason
to believe that the university was considering the immediate adoption of
either alternative. The students were asked which plan they preferred.
Students tended to denigrate whichever of the two compromise proposals
the trustees had been said to offer, and to prefer the alternative proposal.
When told that Stanford was allegedly ready to implement the deadline
plan, 85% of the respondents ranked specific divestment as the preferred
move. By contrast, when the university purportedly was going to pursue
specific divestment, 60% rated that plan worse than the deadline plan.
Ross has described a range of cognitive and motivational
processes that may account for the reactive devaluation phenomenon.35
Whatever its roots, reactive devaluation certainly can act as a barrier to
the efficient resolution of conflict. It suggests that the exchange of
proposed concessions and compromises between adversaries can be very
problematic. When one side unilaterally offers a concession that it
believes the other side should value and the other side reacts by devaluing
the offer, this can obviously make resolution difficult. The recipient of a
unilateral concession is apt to believe that her adversary has given up
nothing of real value and may therefore resist any notion that she should
offer something of real value in exchange. On the other hand, the failure
to respond may simply confirm the suspicions of the original offeror, who
will believe that her adversary is proceeding in bad faith and is being
strategic.
34. Rob J. Robinson et al., Misconstruing the Views of the 'Other Side': Real and
Perceived Differences in Three Ideological Conflicts, Stanford Center on Conflict and
Negotiation Working Paper No. 18 (June 1990).
35. Id.
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III. OVERCOMING STRATEGIC BARRIERS: THE ROLES OF
NEGOTIATORS AND MEDIATORS
The study of barriers can do more than simply help us understand
why negotiations sometimes fail when they should not. It can also
contribute to our understanding of how to overcome these barriers. Let
me illustrate this by using the preceding analysis of four barriers briefly to
explore the role of mediators, and to suggest why neutrals can often
facilitate the efficient resolution of disputes by overcoming these specific
barriers.
First, let us consider the strategic barrier. To the extent that a
neutral third party is trusted by both sides, the neutral may be able to
induce the parties to reveal information about their underlying interests,
needs, priorities, and aspirations that they would not disclose to their
adversary. This information may permit a trusted mediator to help the
parties enlarge the pie in circumstances where the parties acting alone
could not. Moreover, a mediator can foster a problem-solving atmosphere
and lessen the temptation on the part of each side to engage in strategic
behavior. A skilled mediator can often get parties to move beyond
political posturing and recriminations about past wrongs and to instead
consider possible gains from a fair resolution of the dispute.
A mediator also can help overcome barriers posed by
principal/agent problems. A mediator may bring clients themselves to the
table, and help them understand their shared interest in minimizing legal
fees and costs in circumstances where the lawyers themselves might not be
doing so. In circumstances where a middle manager is acting to prevent a
settlement that might benefit the company, but might be harmful to the
manager's own career, an astute mediator can sometimes bring another
company representative to the table who does not have a personal stake in
the outcome.
A mediator can also promote dispute resolution by helping
overcome cognitive barriers. Through a variety of processes, a mediator
can often help each side understand the power of the case from the other
side's perspective. Moreover, by reframing the dispute and suggesting a
resolution that avoids blame and stresses the positive aspects of a
resolution, a mediator may be able to lessen the effects of loss aversion.
My colleague Tversky thinks that cognitive barriers are like optical
illusions -- knowing that an illusion exists does not necessarily enable us to
see things differently.36 Nevertheless, I believe that astute mediators can
dampen loss aversion through reframing, by helping a disputant
36. Tversky & Thaler, supra note 30.
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reconceptualize the resolution. By emphasizing the potential gains to both
sides of the resolution and de-emphasizing the losses that the resolution is
going to entail, mediators (and lawyers) often facilitate resolution.
With respect to the fourth barrier, reactive devaluation, mediators
can play an important and quite obvious role. Reactive devaluation can
often be sidestepped if the source of a proposal is a neutral - not one of
the parties. Indeed, one of the trade secrets of mediators is that after
talking separately to each side about what might or might not be
acceptable, the mediator takes responsibility for making a proposal. This
helps both parties avoid reactive devaluation by allowing them to accept as
sensible a proposal that they might have rejected if it had come directly
from their adversary.
IV. CONCLUSION
In closing, I would like to leave you with three basic ideas. The
first idea concerns the importance of the basic question around which this
evening's lecture has been organized: What are the barriers to the
efficient and fair resolution of conflict? I hope that you agree that this
question is profoundly important, not only for those of us who are
researchers, but for those who are practitioners as well.
The second idea concerns the inherently interdisciplinary nature of
our field. In this lecture, I have shown how barriers can be explored from
a variety of different perspectives. I have drawn on work relating to the
game theory and the economics of bargaining, principal/agent economics,
cognitive psychology, and social psychology. Other disciplines also have
much to offer. Our understanding of conflict resolution would surely be
enriched by careful exploration of barriers from the perspectives of other
social sciences, such as anthropology, sociology, political science, and
from the humanities. History, literature, and theology all offer useful
contributions.
The third idea is a corollary of the second. No theoretical
perspective, and no single discipline, has a monopoly on useful insights
concerning the barriers to the fair and efficient resolution of conflict.
Indeed, progress with respect to our understanding of conflict is going to
turn very fundamentally on the ability of people from different disciplines
to learn from one another and work together to improve both theory and
practice. One goal of this research should be not simply to better
understand why negotiations fail, but to help us learn - whether as parties
or as neutrals - to overcome the barriers to the negotiated resolution of
conflict.

